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INTRODUCTION
The recent Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations,
instituted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade'
(GATT), 2 adopted substantive rules regulating certain non-tariff
I. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signalure Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-I, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATTI]. The current
operative text is published in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969). Hereinafter, all references to the
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS series, the official GATT source, shall

be cited as BISD.
2. The acronym GATT refers to both the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade and the international body supervising the agreement. This Note shall employ the
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trade restrictions 3 and dispute settlement procedures for the enforcement of those rules.4 Although similar dispute settlement procedures
existed under the original 1947 General Agreement, 5 they had fallen
into disuse during the late 1960's and early 1970's. 6 The Tokyo

Round procedures prompted a revival of the GATT dispute settleacronym in both senses. It will be clear from the context whether the agreement or the
supervising body is intended.
3. The Tokyo Round adopted six new Codes regulating non-tariff barriers to trade.
They are:
(1) Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/211/Rev. 1, reprinted in
H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 7 andin BISD (26th Supp.) 116 (1980). 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as H.R. Doc. No. 153].
(2) Agreement on Government Procurement, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/
211/Rev. 2, reprintedin H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 69; andin BISD (26th Supp.) 3

(1980).
(3) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/
W/192/Rev. 5, reprintedin H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 211; andin BISD (26th Supp.)
8 (1980).
(4) Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/
NTM/W236 [hereinafter cited without cross reference as Subsidies Code],
reprintedin H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 259; and in BISD (26th Supp.) 56 (1980).
(5) Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tarifis and Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/232, reprinted in H.R. Doc.
No. 153, at 311; and in BISD (26th Supp.) 171 (1980).
(6) Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/
W/23 1/Rev. 2, reprintedin H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 193; andin BISD (26th Supp.)

154 (1980).

4. All of the new Codes contain procedures for dispute settlement with the exception of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. See Agreement on Import
Licensing Procedures, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/231/Rev. 2, Art. 4, reprintedin H.R.
Doc. No. 153, at 202; andin BISD (26th Supp.) 159 (reference to Article XXIII procedures). See also Hudec, GAT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round- An Unfinished
Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 148 n.4 (1980).
5. GATT Article XXIII(s) allows signatory nations to submit disputes to the Contracting Parties. It states: "The CONTRACTING PARTIEs shall promptly investigate any
matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as
appropriate." BISD (4th Supp.) 40 (1969). After an early unsettled period, the dispute
settlement process now relies on a standard procedure in which three to five officials from
nations without any interest in the dispute sit as a tribunal and render a decision based
upon the General Agreement. For a discussion of the early development of this panel
procedure, see R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY
66-83 (1975).
6. Commentators have suggested many reasons for the 1960's breakdown in GATT
dispute settlement; among them: procedural weakness in the panel process delaying the
institution of a panel and the final rendering of a decision; a shift in GATT political
power from "legalistic" tribunal-oriented Anglo-American nations to pragmatic negotiation-oriented nations such as Japan and the EC; and the growth in the number of inoperative rules which are unenforceable by the panel procedure. See generaly MTN AND
THE LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE, SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, 96TH CONG., lsT Snss. 14-17 (COMM.
PRINT 1979); Hudec, supra note 5, at 193-99; Graham, Results ofthe Tokyo Round, 9 GA.
J. INTrL & COMP. L. 153, 171 (1979); Hudec, supra note 4, at 151-53.
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ment process. 7 Two cases brought during this revitalization, one by
Australia,8 the other by Brazil, 9 claimed that the European Community's (EC) sugar export subsidies violated GATT Article XVI. In a
carefully worded opinion, a GATT panel in the Australian case
found that factual complexities precluded a finding of EC liability
under the specific GATT provision applicable to agricultural export
subsidies, Article XVI:3, but that the EC's sugar export subsidies
nevertheless constituted a "threat of serious prejudice" 10 to Australia
1 In particuunder a more general GATT provision, Article XVI: 1.
lar, the panel objected to the unlimited subsidies available under the
EC program. 12 The panel left little doubt that the EC subsidy was
inconsistent with GATT standards, but its decision, relying on the
general and not the specific GATT provision, was not a model of
authoritative decision making.13 Similarly, in the Brazilian case a
GATT panel found no violation of Article XVI:3, but held that EC
sugar subsidies violated the serious prejudice standard of Article
XVI: 1.1 4 As in the Australian case, the panel objected tqthe unlim-

15
ited funds available to finance export refunds.
As a practical matter, the GATT itself has no power to sanction
an offending member. It "enforces" panel -decisions by relying on
the normative pressure exerted through organized community condemnation by the GATT signatories.16 Thus, the enf6rcement of a
panel's decision can result in a diplomatic "tug of war"-between the
GATT signatories and the adjudged offender. In reaction to the criticism of GATT signatories, the EC has modified its iugar subsidy
7. At a panel discussion on GATT dispute settlement sponsored by the American
Society of International law Professors, Robert Hudec stated:
The amount of attention given to dispute settlement during the Tokyo
Round generated a kind of momentum behind dispute settlement in general.
More complainants were inspired to bring their legal problems to the disputes
procedure, and once they got there, it was a little more difficult for dependent
governments to resist.
AM. SOC. OF INT'L L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 74TH ANNUAL MEETING, 129, 133 (1980)
(comments of R. Hudec).
8. Australian Complaint Against European Communities Refunds on Exports of
Sugar, GATT Doc. L/4701 (1978).
9. Brazilian Complaint Against European Communities Refunds on Exports of
Sugar, GATT Doc. L/5011 (1980).
10. Because the term "serious prejudice" has a specific meaning in the context of
international trade disputes, it will hereinafter be referred to in text and footnotes as
seriousprejudice.
11. European Communities-Refunds on Exports of Sugar-Complaint by Australia, BISD (26th Supp.) 290 (1980). [hereinafter cited as AUSTRALIAN DECISION].
12. Id. at 316, 319.
13. Id. at 319. See Hudec, supra note 4, at 192.
14. European Communities-Refunds on Exports of Sugar-Complaint by Brazil,
BISD (27th Supp.) 97 (1981) [hereinafter cited as BRAZILIAN DECISION].
15. I
16. Id at 150.
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program. 17 The GATT signatories remain unsatisfied, however, and
further modifications are unlikely.18 They persist in their efforts to
enforce mandatory production or financial limits, 19 which they claim
GATT Article XVI:1 requires. 20
The decisions in the Australian and the Brazilian cases should
not be enforced strictly. While both panels expressed displeasure at
the EC sugar subsidy program, they based their decisions on the
indefinite and weak seriousprejudice provision of GATT Article
XVI:1. Upon a finding of seriousprejudice, Article XVI:I merely
requires discussions concerning "the possibility of limiting the subsidization." 21 EC participation in 1981 GATT discussions and subsequent CAP reforms may have satisfied the Article XVI: I
22
requirements.
As a matter of GATT law, the strict enforcement of the Australian and the Brazilian decisions presents questions concerning the
consensus behind recent Tokyo Round amendments to GATT Article XVI, and the potential for making the amendments effective
practical tools for regulating agricultural export subsidies. The
Tokyo Round multilateral trade negotiations changed GATT Article
XVI:3 significantly, by replacing its indefinite standard with more
precise and more easily demonstrable provisions. 23 A compromise
between the United States, a primary product exporter, and the EC,
a primary product subsidizer, made the amendment possible.24 Nevertheless, the consensus behind the meaning of the amendment standard is uncertain. 25 After applying nearly the same standard that
was subsequently codified at the Tokyo Round, 26 the panel in the
17. For a discussion of CAP sugar subsidy modifications, see infra text accompanying notes 222-42.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 246-50.
19. Riddle-me-ree, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1981, at 96.
20. See Hume, Porges & Ehrenhaft, GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade: Panel
Reports on Tax Measures and AgriculturalPolicy, 20 I.L.M. 843, 846 (1981).
21. GATT, supra note 1, art. XVI, para. 1.
22. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 126-33.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37. For the purposes of this Note, the
meaning of the term "primary product" shall correspond to the official GATT definition
as provided in a note to the original agreement, deleting only the official text's reference
to minerals, as mandated by the Subsidies Code (Art. 9, n. 7 BISD (26th Supp.) 68
(1980)): "[A] 'primary product' is understood to be any product, of farm, forest or
fishery,.. . in its natural form or which has undergone such processing as is customarily
required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade."
GATT, Note Ad. Art. XVI, Section B, paragraph 2, BISD (4th Supp.) 68 (1969).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 133-43.
26. For a comparison of the legal standards applied in these decisions and those
codified at the Tokyo Round see infra text accompanying notes 156-58. Both the sugar
decisions and the Tokyo Round adopted the displacement standard that was applied in a
late 1950's GATT panel decision. GATT, French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and
Wheat Flour, BISD (7th Supp.) 46 (1959). [hereinafter cited as FRENCH WHEAT DECI-
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Australian case was unable to find a violation of Article XVI:3. 27
Similarly, the panel in the Brazilian case applied the Tokyo Round
28
standard for interpreting Article XVI:3 yet found no violation.
Thus, the decisions are inconsistent with the Tokyo Round standard.
Although the attempts to enforce the decisions strictly are popular
with agricultural interests of GATT primary product exporters, these
efforts conflict with the overriding goal of achieving a broad consensus behind the Tokyo Round amendments. Attempts to enforce
these decisions strictly should cease, and new complaints, initiated
under the Tokyo Round amendments, should replace them.
I. THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND
WORLD AGRICULTURAL TRADE
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the EC's agricultural
price support regime. It is calculated to achieve three goals: common pricing, Community preference, and unlimited common financing.29 The CAP covers ninety percent of EC farm production.
Potatoes and agricultural alcohol are the only major products
exempted. 30 It guarantees producers in all member states a uniform
internal price (common pricing) which is usually above the prevailing world market price.31 Generally, agricultural agencies of the
member governments intervene in agricultural markets and
purchase regulated commodities when market prices fall below the
internal price. 32 The variable levy, an import tax calculated to raise
import prices above the internal price,33 prevents imports from capitalizing on the high internal price.34 EC regulations ensure greater
demand for EC produced goods than for imported goods (Community preference). 35 The EC, rather than individual member governments, finances this program through the European Agriculture
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (known by its French acronym
FEOGA), which has unlimited resources and constitutes a major
SION]; AUSTRALIAN DECISION, supra note 11 at 310; Rivers & Greenwald, The Negotia-

tion of a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy
Differences, 11 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 1447, 1478 (1979).
27. AUSTRALIAN DECISION, supra note 11, at 319.
28. BRAZILIAN DECISION, supra note 14, at 90-92, 97.
29. Executive Branch GATT Study No. 12-The Common Agricultural Policy of the

European Community, in SUBCOMM. ON INT'L TRADE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, EXECUTIVE BRANCH GAIT STUDIES 166-67 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter
cited as GATT STUDY No. 12].
30. Farming in the EEC, ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 1980, at 52.

31. Id at 53. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
32. Farming in the EEC, supra note 30, at 52.
33. For an explanation of the calculation of the variable levy, see GATT STUDY No.
12, supra note 29, at 163-64.
34. Farming in the EEC, supra note 30, at 52.
35. GATT STUDY No 12, supra note 29, at 166.

402

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:397

36
share of the total EC budget (common financing).
The CAP is exceedingly protectionist. Although other forms of
assistance are possible, such as direct subsidies to inefficient farmers,
the EC has selected price level regulation as its exclusive form of
assistance. 37 The Council of Ministers, composed of the farm ministers of the EC member nations, fixes farm prices annually. 38 The EC
Farm Commissioner, an EC official, suggests CAP modifications,
but the final decision remains with the Council of Ministers, each
member of which attempts to extract the maximum benefit for his
own country and his own farmers. 39 Consequently, agricultural
prices tend to be fixed at very high levels with little regard to supply
and demand.4° Some have concluded that the CAP's effect is such
that, "for several basic farm products Community agriculture has
'41
been effectively isolated from the world market.
The inflated CAP price encourages production. For example,
production under the CAP in 1972-73 compared to the pre-CAP

1962-63 average increased 26% for wheat and 128% for corn. 42 Such

production increases create agricultural surpluses, as the minimum
price guaranteed by the CAP encourages more production by farmers than consumers are willing to purchase at that price.
A subsidizing government, in this case the EC, has various
options in disposing of agricultural surpluses. It may stockpile the
surplus, incurring storage costs, 43 or it may send the surplus abroad
as a form of foreign aid.44 The EC relies heavily on export subsidies
36. In 1973, the FEOGA accounted for 76% of the EC budget. Id at 208. In 1981
high world farm prices held spending down so that the CAP only constituted approximately 71% of the EC budget. Savedby World FoodPrices?,ECONOMIST, May 30, 1981,
at 46.
37. GATT STUDY No. 12, supra note 29, at 210.
38. Farmingin the EEC, supra note 30, at 52.
39. Id
40. Id; GATT STUDY No. 12, supra note 29, at 210.
41. ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES, GATT PLUS-A PROPOSAL FOR
TRADE REFORM 26 (1976).

42. GATT STUDY No. 12, supra note 29, at 164.
43. For instance, the EC maintains "mountains" of dairy products, particularly butter, which is the most costly product to store. How to Cut Your Milk Bill by Raising Other
People's, ECONOMIST, June 6, 1981, at 53.
44. As with export subsidies, food aid may dislocate world agricultural trade by displacing commercial food sales. K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECO-

266-270 (1970). EC officials complain privately that the U.S.
Food for Peace program, providing food aid to less developed counries, is merely a less
obvious form of agriculture subsidization. Patterson, Keeping Them Happy Down on the
Farm 36 FOREIGN POLICY 63, 68-9 (1979). With respect to international regulation of
food aid, see generally, A Bard,Food Aid and InternationalAgricultural Trade (1972);
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FAO Principles of
Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations of Member Nations (1972).
NOMIC ORGANIZATION
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to promote private foreign sales of surpluses. 45 The CAP encourages
private producers to sell their goods abroad by offering refunds
equal to the difference between the world market price and the inter46
nal market price.
Export subsidies cause dislocation in international trade. They

encourage inefficient production in the subsidized market, and cause
other nations that perceive the subsidies as aggressive measures to
enact competing trade restrictions. 47 For example, if subsidized
exports capture an unacceptably large share of a foreign market,
injuring a competing domestic producer, the foreign government
may protect local industry by instituting countervailing import
duties, thereby nullifying the effect of the export subsidy. 48 When

export subsidies allow an exporter to gain an unacceptably large
share of a third country market at the expense of another exporter,
that exporter's government may respond with equally competitive
export subsidies.49 This process easily may deteriorate into a competitive subsidization race.50 Such a race allegedly was discovered in

1961 when a GATT working party found that twenty of thirty-four

51
countries studied maintained some form of cereal subsidy.

Alternatively, governments harmed by export subsidies may
pursue remedies within the GATT framework, alleging a breach of

GATT Article XVI. Article XVI contains five paragraphs. 52 The
original 1947 GATT contained only the general first paragraph. 53 In
1955 the contracting parties amended the GATT, adding the remaining four paragraphs that deal specifically with export subsidies. 54 By
1969 all signatories had acceeded to the 1955 amendments 5 5 except

paragraph four, which deals with export subsidies on nonprimary
45. In the agricultural sector, the Europeans had gone so far as to institutionalize
export subsidies. Restitution payments on the export of agricultural goods were a central
part of the EC's Common Agricultural Policy." Rivers & Greenwold, supra note 27, at
1452.
46. H. MALMGREN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PEACEKEEPING IN PHASE 11125-26
(1972); see generally Farmingin the EEC, supra note 30, at 51-54.
47. Barcelo, Subsidies, CountervailingDuties andAntidumpingAfter the Tokyo Round,
13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257, 261-64 (1980). See also Barcelo, Subsidiesand Countervailing
Duties-Analysis and a Proposal,9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 779, 794-99 (1977).
48. The right to impose a countervailing duty under the GATT is restricted to cases
where there is a showing of "material injury" to the importing nation. GATT, supra note
1, art. VI BISD (4th Supp.) 10-12 (1969); Subsidies Code, supra note 3, art. 2, BISD (26th
Supp.) 57, n.4 (1980).
49. Some specific examples of such competing export subsidies are mentioned in K.
DAM, supra note 44, at 136.
50. Id
51. J.JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 368 (1969).
52. GATT supra note 1, art. XVI.
53. Id, para. 1;Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 27, at 1459.
54. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 27 at 1460.
55. J.JACKSON, supra note 51, at 376.
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products.
Article XVI:I requires a nation "which grants or maintains any
subsidy. . . which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports
of any product from, or reduce imports of any products into, its territory. . . [to] notify the Contracting Parties." 57 In addition, if such
subsidization causes or threatens to cause seriousprejudice to the
interests of any other contracting party, discussions may be
58
requested concerning the possibility of limiting the subsidization.
The notification and consultation requirements of Article XVI:1 do
not impose arduous restraints on governments. 5 9 In practice, GATT
signatory nations use the Article XVI:1 consultation provision to
establish bilateral discussions that the nations conduct independent
of any GATT determination of seriousprejudice.60 After agreeing to
consult, Article XVI:l merely requires the party imposing the subsidy to "discuss the possibility of limiting the subsidization."' 61 One
commentator has suggested that "It]he legal or moral force of this
obligation is probably not sufficient to overcome the domestic politics behind many presently existing subsidies." 62 According to a
recent article, "there is no record of any country ever having limited
a subsidizing practice as a result of consultations under Article XVI,
paragraph 1.1"63
Article XVI:4 prohibits export subsidies on nonprimary products which result in export prices lower than domestic prices. 64 Primary product export subsidies are not prohibited. Article XVI:3
states, "contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies
on the export of primary products. ' 65 If a signatory does grant a
primary product export subsidy, however, Article XVI:3 provides
that "such subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results in
that contracting party having more than an equitable share of world
export trade in thatproduct, account being taken of the shares of the
56. Id at 374-75.
57. GATT, supra note 1, art. XVI, para. 1.
58. Id The actual text does not specify who may request discussions. It states:
In any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any
other contracting party is caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the
contracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other
contracting party or parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the
possibility of limiting the subsidization.

Id
59. GATT, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
[hereinafter cited as THE TOKYO ROUND].

TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

60. J. JACKSON, supra note 51, at 391.
61. GATT, supra note 1, art. XVI, para. 1.
62. J. JACKSON, supra note 51, at 392.
63. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 27, at 1459-60.
64. GATT, supra note 1, art. XVI, para. 4.
65. GATT, supra note 1, art. XVI, para. 3 (emphasis added).

55 (1979)

1982]

SUGAR EXPORT SUBSIDIES

contracting parties in such trade in the product during a previous
representative period." 66 Thus, without more, the text of Article
XVI:3 provides no meaningful prohibition on primary product
export subsidies. "[T]here is no guidance as to what is and what is
67
not an equitable world market share."
Until the mid-1970's, two major factors inhibited the adjudication of complaints under Article XVI:3. First, prospective litigants
68
were frustrated by the inherent ambiguity of the Article's standard.
Second, during the 1960's and early 1970's, GATT signatories aban69
doned the dispute resolution process almost entirely.
The Article XVI:3 standard presented numerous definitional
questions to both prospective litigants and adjudicating panels. The
"equitable" standard was indefinite, 70 and the frame of reference,
"world export trade," was ineffective because so few subsidies substantially affected world market shares.7 ' The lone decision effectively invoking Article XVI:3 demonstrated this definitional
difficulty. In 1958, Australia filed a complaint with the GATT alleging that subsidized French wheat flour had displaced Australian
flour from its traditional Southeast Asian markets. 72 The panel that
decided the case avoided the equitable share question, and instead
focused on the "displacement" of Australian flour by subsidized
French flour.7 3 Eventually, the Australians and the French concluded a bilateral agreement on exports of flour to Southeast Asia
74
that resolved the matter.
In addition to definitional uncertainties, the overall breakdown
in the GATT dispute resolution process during the 1960's and early
1970's drastically reduced the number of complaints heard pursuant
to the GATT panel procedure. 75 Only one consultation applied
Article XVI in the 1960's.76 During this period, however, agricultural protection and the attendant use of export subsidies continued
66. Id (emphasis added).
67. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 27, at 1461 & n.77.
68. Id
69. See supra note 6.
70. K. DAM, supra note 44, at 142-43.
71. Id at 143.
72. FRENCH WHEAT DECISION, supra note 27, at 22-23, 46-57; Rivers & Greenwald,
supra note 27, at 1461 n. 77.
73. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 27, at 1461 n.77. Because the term "displacement" has a specific meaning in the context of GATT panel decisions, it will hereinafter
be referred to in text and footnotes as displacement.
74. J. JACKSON, supra note 51, at 380.
75. See supra note 6.
76. In 1968 Malawi complained about U.S. tobacco export subsidies. GATT, United
States Subsidy on Unmanufactured Tobacco, BISD (15th Supp.) 116-18 (1967). No decision was rendered on the claim as Malawi only requested a consultation, not a dispute
settlement panel.
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unabated. 77 Cases clearly could have been brought, but Article XVI
was not invoked. Instead, the contracting parties resorted to self78
help measures.
In the uncertain economic climate of the early 1970's, a wave of
protectionist sentiment influenced the national governments of most
major GATT participants. 79 This shift in trade policy attitudes at
the political level threatened the relatively liberal post-war trading
environment developed under the auspices of the GATT.80 The
GATT responded to this danger by sponsoring a new series of trade
negotiations, the Tokyo Round.81
II. THE TOKYO ROUND: GATT ARTICLE XVI
MODIFICATIONS
A.

INTRODUCTION

Six times between 1947 and 1967, the GATT sponsored multilateral negotiations, called rounds, aimed principally at lowering tariffs.82 One commentator estimated that these rounds affected $57.4
billion worth of trade.83 As the average level of tariff protection fell,
however, the use -of non-tariff barriers to trade, such as restrictive
government procurement policies, import-excluding product standards, and trade-distorting subsidies, became more prevalent.8 4 The
latest GATT multilateral negotiations, the Tokyo Round, attempted
to regulate non-tariff barriers through the enactment of six new
objective codes of-condct.8 5 Each of the new codes added detailed
rules and procedures to the comprehensive general code found
within the GATT itself.86 In particular, the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade8 7 (Subsidies Code) addressed the
interrelated problems of countervailing duties and subsidies, and by
means of a major agreement between the United States and the EC,
77. See generally, H. MALMGREN, supra note 46, at 122-33.
78. For example, in 1965 the United States targeted competitive export subsidies on
chicken destined for the Swiss and Austrian markets as a countermeasure to export subsidies provided by the EC. K. DAM, supra note 44, at 136.
79. Hudec, supra note 4, at 153.
80. Id at 153-54.
81. Id
82. For a brief discussion of the six rounds see J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 473-84 (1977).
83. Id at 473.
84. Marks & Malmgren, NegotiatingNontariffDistortionsto Trade, 7 L. & POL'Y IN
INT'L Bus. 327, 328 (1975); Rivers and Greenwald, supra note 27, at 1450-51.
85. See supra note 3.
86. Hudec, supra note 4, at 147, 154 n. 18.
87. Subsidies Code, supra note 3.
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refined the primary products export subsidy regulations.
B.

88

BACKGROUND OF THE SUBSIDIES CODE NEGOTIATIONS

GATT Article VI requires signatory nations to demonstrate
"material injury" to a domestic industry before enacting countervailing duties against subsidized exports. 89 The United States Tariff
Act of 193090 mandated the imposition of countervailing duties
against subsidized exports without regard to any injury criterion, 91
and was exempt from GATT Article VI because it pre-dated the
1947 General Agreement. 92 The prospect of increased United States
countervailing duty activity without regard to the injury caused to
domestic industry posed both political and economic problems for
United States trading partners. 93 To them, the paramount issue in
the negotiation of the Subsidies Code was United States acceptance
of the requirement that a country94must show a material injury before
instituting countervailing duties.
At the outset of the Tokyo Round, the United States offered to
negotiate an injury test into its law, 95 but linked this concession to
achieving an international agreement concerning discipline in subsidy practices. 96 Unlike the United States, which opposes governmental involvement in international commerce, most nations view
subsidies as facts of modern economic life and important tools of
national policy.97 Further, the Europeans were reluctant to sacrifice
these practices in exchange for the mere acceptance of the existing
GATT rules by the United States. 98 Thus, the major Subsidies Code
88. Commentators repeatedly have alluded to the importance of the Subsidies Code
to the Tokyo Round negotiation. Echols, Section 301: Access to ForeignMarketfrom an
AgriculturalPerspective, 6 INT'L TRADE L. J. 4, 11 (1980) ("effect of the negotiation...
will be judged largely by the implementation of the [Subsidies Code] and the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade"); Graham, Revolution in Trade Politics, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Fall 1979, 49, 52 ("centerpiece" of the Tokyo Round); Rivers & Greenwald, supra note
27, at 1450 ("had the subsidies/countervailing duty negotiations not succeeded, the 'success' of the [multilateral trade negotiations] would have been a good deal less").
89. GATT, supra note 1, art. VI, para. 1.
90. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 303, 46 Stat. 590 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303 (1976) (amended 1979)).
91. Id; see also THE TOKYO ROUND, supra note 59, at 58.
92. The GATT applies to contracting parties through a Protocol of Provisional
Application which was signed on Oct. 30, 1947. The Protocol exempts legislation that
was "existing" at the time of signing from the GATT rules. Protocol of Provisional
Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. 1, para. (b). 61 Stat.
A205 1, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
93. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 27, at 1453.
94. Id at 1453-54; THE TOKYO RoUmN, supra note 59 at 59.
95. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 27, at 1454.
96. SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE, SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE,
96TH CONG., IST SEss., 6 MTN STUDIES-PART 1 105 (Comm. Print 1979).
97. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 27, at 1452-53.
98. Id at 1454.
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negotiations revolved around the extent of international subsidy discipline which the United States would receive for its countervailing
duty concession. 99
Regarding subsidies, the United States had two goals. First, the
nation had an overriding interest in establishing a "legalist"
approach to the Tokyo Round negotiations.'00 That is, the United
States sought to define rules clearly and to encourage resort to thirdparty adjudication. ° ' Consistent with these objectives, the United
States committed itself to an agreement which would improve international discipline concerning the use of subsidies. A recent article
states that "there was a. . .general appreciation that, given the significant and growing government involvement in international commerce, some form of agreement establishing ground rules for such
behavior was essential in order to avoid sharp conflict over trade
02
matters in the future."'
This "legalist" motivation, however, was tempered by more selfish special interest opposition to specific subsidy practices. 10 3 In particular, United States agricultural interests opposed the CAP export
subsidy system.' 04 They shared this opposition with other primary
product exporters, particularly Australia. 105
The initial negotiating position of the United States, embodied
in "concepts papers" submitted to the negotiations, condemned subsidies as intrinsically bad.i 06 It became clear, however, that other
delegations would not negotiate on the basis of the "concepts
papers." In response, the United States revised its approach, making
several "concessions."' 107 In particular, "the United States agreed to
drop its insistence that subsidies be classified as intrinsically good or
bad and to focus instead upon the effects of subsidies on trade."' 08 A
99. Id at 1454-55.
100. "A 'legalist' viewpoint has supported the effort to write clearly defined rules and
has urged the importance of a third-party adjudication procedure that can objectively
apply such rules in disputed cases." Hudec, supra note 4, at 151. The United States
originally designed the "legalist model," and played an important role in establishing the
"legalist" direction of the Tokyo Round negotiations. See generall, id at 149-58.
101. Id
102. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 27, at 1452.
103. Id at 1451-52.
104. See, e.g., The Trade Reform Act of 1973: Hearings on H. 10710 Before Sen.
Comm on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 964-65, 1004-05 (1979) (Statements of Patrick B.
Healy, Secretary, National Milk Producers Federation, and William J.Kuhfuss, President, American Farm Bureau Federation).
105. So Far,So Good, ECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 1980, at 61; 387 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY

(BNA) 310 (Dec. 15, 1981).
106. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 27, at 1465-66. "Concepts papers" are narrative
discussions of proposed agreements.
107. Id at 1466.
108. Id
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parallel development occurred in the negotiations concerning primary products. During the first two and one-half years of negotiations, the United States attempted to force the EC into giving up the
CAP, a process Robert Strauss, Chief U.S. negotiator at the Tokyo
Round, described as, "baying at the Moon."' 0 9 Strauss persuaded
U.S. farm leaders of the futility of the negotiations and softened the
U.S. opposition to the CAP. 10 He instituted more pragmatic negotiations aimed at liberalizing the CAP.' The Subsidies Code provisions refining GATT Articles XVI reflect the revised U.S. position
regarding subsidy practices and the CAP.
C.

THE SUBSIDIES CODE AS APPLIED TO AGRICULTURAL EXPORT

SUBSIDIES

The Subsidies Code is divided into two sections, or tracks, that
are distinguished by the remedies allowed under each. Track I, the
countervailing duty law, covering Articles 1-6 of the Code, allows
unilateral reaction when foreign trade practices disrupt a domestic
industry. 112 Track II, covering Articles 7-19 of the Code, authorizes
government-to-government complaint procedures when a foreign
trade practice disrupts either domestic or foreign markets.' 3 Thus,
for disruptions in the domestic market, either remedy is potentially
available.

114

Subsidies Code Articles 7-13'115 regulate subsidies. These provisions, like GATT Article XVI, provide two potential standards to
regulate primary product export subsidies: serious prejudice and
displacement.

First, as with GATT Article XVI: 1, there is the general serious
prejudice standard. Subsidies Code Articles 8 and 12 provide that
bilateral consultations, and possibly dispute settlement procedures,
may result from a signatory's claim of seriousprejudice." 6 Upon a
signatory's charge of seriousprejudice, two procedural paths allow
109. TradeAgreementsAct of 1979: Hearingson S. 1376 Before the Subcomna on Int'l
Trade of the Senate Comm on Finance, 96th Congress, Ist Sess. 418 (1979). (Testimony

of Robert S. Strauss, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations).
110. I.d
111. Id
112. Subsidies Code, supra note 3, at 261-75. See also AM. Soc. OF INT'L L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 73RD ANNUAL MEETING 65-66 (1979) (remarks C. Fred Bergsten,
Asst. Secty. for Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Treasury).

113. Subsidies Code, supra note 3, at 257. See also AM. SOC. OF INT'L L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 73RD ANNUAL MEETING 66-70 (1979) (remarks of C. Fred Bergsten, Asst.

Secty. for Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Treasury).
114. Barcelo, supra note 47 at 266.
115. Subsidies Code, supra note 3, Arts. 7-13.
116. Id, art. 8, para. 3(c); art. 12, para. 3.
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access to dispute settlement mechanisms.1 1 7 In particular, Article 8
states that "Signatories ... agree that they shall seek to avoid causing, through the use of any subsidy. . . (c) seriousprejudice to the

interests of another signatory."' 18 Both paths require at least sixty

days of bilateral consultations before third party adjudication.' 19
A commentator has expressed hope that the adoption of countermeasures triggered by claims of serious prejudice will increase
GATT strength in the subsidies area. 120 There is little apparent reason, however, why the seriousprejudice standard should prompt any
greater discipline than it did when embodied in GATT Article
XVI:l. 12 1 As with Article XVI:l, this indefinite standard is contained in general anti-subsidy provisions. 122 The language of Subsidies Code Article 8 does not prohibit subsidies that cause serious
prejudice. Rather, signatories merely promise that they win "seek to
117. The first path derives from the seriousprejudice standard in Article 8. Article
8(3) states that "signatories further agree that they shall seek to avoid causing, through
the use of any subsidy... (c) serious prejudice to the interests of another signatory." Id
art. 8, para. 3. Under Article 12(1), a signatory believing seriousprejudice has occurred
under Article 8(3), may request consultations with the subsidizing signatory. Id art. 12,
para. 1. The request must contain a statement of available evidence. Id art. 12, para. 2.
The subsidizing signatory is required to enter such consultations as quickly as possible.
Id art. 12, para. 5. If a mutually acceptable solution is not reached within thirty days,
any signatory may refer the matter to the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Committee for conciliation. Id art. 13, para. 1. If after a conciliation period of thirty days, the
matter is still unresolved, any signatory involved may request a panel. Id art. 20, para.
3.
The second path derives from the seriouspreudice standard in Article 12. Article 12(3)
states, "whenever a signatory has reason to believe that any subsidy is being granted or
maintained by another signatory and that such subsidy.., causes... serious prejudice
to its interests, such signatory may request consultations with such other signatory." Id
art. 12, para. 3. The request must include a statement of available evidence regarding the
existence and nature of the subsidy, and the adverse affects caused. Id art. 12, para. 4.
The subsidizing signatory is required to enter into such consultations as quickly as possible. Id art. 12, para. 5. Ifa mutually acceptable solution is not reached within sixty days
any party may refer the matter to the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Committee
for conciliation. Id art. 13, para 2. If after a conciliation period of thirty days, the
matter is still unresolved, any signatory involved may request a panel. Id art. 17, para.
3. The panel should be established within thirty days of the request, and should deliver
its findings wthin sixty days. Id art. 18, para. 2.
118. Subsidies Code, supra note 3, art. 8, para. 3 (emphasis added). The language
creating the obligation, "seek to avoid," is the same as that in GATT Article XVI:3.
119. The first path, triggered by Article 8(3), requires thirty days of consultations. id
art. 13, para. 1, and thirty days of conciliation, id art. 17, para. 3. The second path,
triggered by Article 12(3), requires sixty days of consultations. Id, art. 12, para. 5, and
thirty days of conciliation. Id art. 17, para. 3.
120. Graham, Reforming the InternationalTrading System: The Tokyo Round Trade
Negotiations in the FinalStage, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 23 (1979).
121. For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of GATT Article XVI:l, see supra text
accompanying notes 57-63.
122. GATT Article XVI:I applies to "any subsidy... which operates directly or indirectly'to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into,
its territory.. ." GATT, supra note 1, art. XVI, para. 1.
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avoid" causing seriousprejudice.123 In addition, although the Code
adds the prospect of eventual third party adjudication, it appears
that it also increases access to GATT Article XVI:1 type consultations. 124 Signatories thus may resolve their differences without
recourse to third party adjudication. 25 Particularly when applied to
primary product export subsidy litigation, where the Code enacted
significant changes, the seriousprejudice provisions do not appear to
strengthen the traditionally weak standard.
In contrast to the Subsidies Code's repetition of serious
prejudice, the indefinite "more than equitable share of world export
trade" standard of GATT Article XVI:3 was made tighter and more
precise. One commentator has called the improvement, "a major
step toward resolving the main problems in our important agricultural export markets."1 26 Subsidies Code Article 10127 deals specifically with primary product export subsidies, relying on concepts of
displacement and price undercutting.12 8 Paragraph 2129 refines and
clarifies the "more than an equitable share of world export trade"
standard found in GATT Article XVI:3. First, the paragraph adopts
the reasoning of the French Wheat case, 30 stating that "'more than
an equitable share of world export trade' shall include any case in
which the effect of an export subsidy granted by a signatory is to
displace the exports of another signatory bearing in mind the developments on world markets."' 13 1 It further clarifies the standard by
stating that " 'a previous representative period' shall normally be the
three most recent calendar years in which normal market conditions
existed."' 32 Finally, paragraph 3 states that the "[s]ignatories further
agree not to grant export subsidies on exports of certain primary
products to a particular market in a manner which results in prices
123. Id art. 8, para. 3. The language "seek to avoid" was used in GATT Article
XVI:3. When compared with GATT Article XVI:4, which created a prohibition on nonprimary product export subsidies, GATT Article XVI:3 was interpreted not to create a
prohibition on primary product export subsidies. THE TOKYO ROUND, supra note 59, at
54-55.
124. Zedalis, Legal Effects of the MultilateralTrade Negotiations: Agricultural Commodities, 10 DEN. J. OF INT'L L. 100 (1980).
125. "The Code provisions emphasize efforts to resolve problems in a 'mutually
acceptable' manner through consultation and conciliation." Rivers & Greenwald, supra
note 27, at 1488.
126. AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., PROCEEDING OF THE 73RD ANNUAL MEETING 66, 67-68
(1979) (remarks of C. Fred Bergsten, Asst. Secty. for Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury).
127. Subsidies Code, supra note 3, art. 10.
128. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 27, at 1478.
129. Subsidies Code, supra note 3, art. 10, para. 2.
130. For a brief discussion of the French Wheat case see supra text accompanying
notes 71-74.
131. Subsidies Code, supra note 3, art. 10, para. 2, sec. (b) (emphasis added).
132. Id art. 10, para. 2, sec. (c).
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materially below those of other suppliers to the same market."' 33
The displacement standard arose from a significant United
States-EC compromise. 34 Each party had its own reason for
accepting the new standard. 35 The EC acceded to the displacement
rule because it could downplay criticism of their "concessions" by
claiming that the new standard merely codified GATT common law
precedent, i.e. the French Wheat case. 136 The United States
accepted the new standard because the requisite preliminary factual
showing of displacement made it easier for an aggrieved party to
state a prima facie case than did the "equitable share" standard. 37
As such, the displacement standard offered something to both parties.
The unsettled question underlying the Subsidies Code Article
10 negotiations concerned how strictly the agreed upon standard
would regulate the CAP. The adoption of the displacement standard
has not settled the question. In the words of one critic,
International agreements can mean all things to all people, and the new
code is no exception; had the EC believed the code would prevent what it
considers an internal agricultural policy-export restitution-the EC surely
would not have initialed the new agreement. U.S. negotiators meanwhile
assured Congress 38
that the Code would bring more discipline to the use of
export subsidies. 1

Between these two poles, however, each side conceded something in
creating the standard. Although the EC would not tolerate a direct
assault on the CAP, the Tokyo Round negotiators perceived some
EC flexibility, which enabled them to modify CAP subsidy effects on
international trade.' 39 While United States agricultural interests, as
well as those of other primary product exporters, vehemently
opposed the CAP,' 4° they conceded its continued existence. Thus,
United States agricultural interest agreed to the overall goal of
achieving an international accord regulating subsidies.' 4 '
This lack of agreement on the operation of the displacement
standard ironically highlights a strength of the Tokyo Round results.
One commentator states that the most important element of the new
Codes is that "they. . .constitute the beginning-and not a final
133. Id art. 10, para. 3.
134. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 27, at 1476-79.
135. Id at 1478.
136. Id
137. Id
138. Patterson, supra note 44, at 67.
139. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 27, at 1477.
140. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
141. The desire to create an interntional agreement regulating subsidization and the
need to appease U.S. agriculture's opposition to the CAP were principal U.S. motivations
in the Subsidies Code negotiations. SeeAsupra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
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step--toward a more open international economy."' 142 An ongoing
consultation and dispute settlement process is necessay43to establish
the practical application of the displacement standard.1
D.

CONCLUSION: THE PREDOMINANCE OF DISPLACEMENT IN
AGRICULTURAL EXPORT SUBSIDY LITIGATION

The result of the negotiations shows that in regard to primary

product export subsidy regulation, the codification of the displacement standard was more important than the reassertion of the serious
prejudice standard. Despite the uncertainty regarding how it ultimately would be applied, the displacement standard tightened the illdefined "more than an equitable share of world export trade" concept, and to some extent signified the willingness of the participants
to work within international limits. The Code's repetition of serious
prejudice, a historically ineffective and general standard, does not
signify such an achievement. In particular, the language of Article 8

creates no obligation, the signatories merely "seek to avoid" causing
seriousprejudice.
Further, the Codes established at the Tokyo Round require
ongoing application and elaboration.144 They invite governments to
make increased use of adjudicatory proceedings, reactivating the
GATT dispute settlement mechanism. 145 Commentators generally
are cautious, however, about the future of GATT dispute settlement. 146 In particular, they fear that the dispute settlement process
may discredit itself by attempting to enforce inoperative or overlyambitious rules. 147 In the words of one commentator, "
A dispute settlement mechanism should be built on modest expectations,
at least at the start. For example, it should not be expected thatll rules will
be immediately followed. However, the mechanism should be designed so
that as time goes on, greater and greater confidence will be placed in the
system, so that it will be more4 8utilized, and so that gradually greater responsibilities can be put upon it.1

The attempt to enforce a decision based upon the seriousprejudice
standard of Subsidies Code Articles 8 and 12 seems overly ambi142. Winham, Robert Strauss, the MTN, andthe Controlof Faction 14 J. OF WORLD
TRADE L. 377, 380 (1980).
143. See generally SUBCOMM. ON INT'L TRADE. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 96TH
CONG., IST SESs., 4 MTN STUDIEs: MTN AND THE LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 20-22 (Comm. Print, 1979).
144. See Hudec, supra note 4, at 198.
Id
145.
146. Id
147. rd at 198-99.
148. Jackson, Government Disputes in InternationalTrade Relations: A Proposalin the
Context of GAYT, 13 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 1, 8 (1979).
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tious. Moreover, it could threaten the credibility of the dispute settlement process.
Due to United States legislation enacting the Tokyo Round
agreements, complaints under Article XVI:3 have increased. Provisions in the Trade Act of 1974,149 as modified by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,150 authorize private parties to initiate suits

alleging GATT violations. Although private parties have no standing to sue under GATT, 151 they may file a petition with the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) who then has forty-five days to
make a preliminary decision regarding whether to pursue the investigation.152 Since 1975, four parties have fied complaints alleging EC/
CAP Article XVI:3 violations. 53 Two still are pending. 154
This increase in Article XVI litigation mirrors the aggregate
increase in GATT dispute settlement litigation generally. Spurred in
part by Tokyo Round reforms in dispute settlement procedures, litigation under the GATT is at its highest level ever. 155 While many
cases are pending, few, in fact, have been decided. Among the few
are two complaints alleging violations of Article XVI by the CAP
sugar export subsidy program.
III.

SUGAR DECISIONS

Australia filed a case with the GATT in 1978 challenging EC
sugar export subsidies on the grounds that they violated GATT Article XVI. Although the panel decided the case before the ratification
of the Subsidies Code, the decision foreshadows the Tokyo Round
modifications to GATT Article XVI. The Subsidies Code negotiations had concluded by the time of the decision, 156 and it is likely
149. 19 U.S.C. § 2422 (Supp. III 1979).
150. 19 U.S.C. § 2501 (Supp. III 1979).
151. deKieffer, GA7YT Dispute Settlements: A New Beginning in Internationaland U.S.
Trade Law, 2 Nw. J. OF INT'L L. & Bus. 317, 327 (1980).
152. Procedures for Complaints Filed Under Section 301 of the Trade act of 1974, As
Amended, 15 C.F.R. § 2006.3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Complaint Procedures]. For a
discussion of procedures in filing complaints, see id at 327-33.
153. Complaint Procedures: Complaint of Great Western Malting Co., 40 Fed. Reg.
54311 (Nov. 21, 1975); Complaint of Millers' National Federation, 40 Fed. Reg. 57249
(Dec. 8, 1975); Complaintof GreatPlains Wheat, Inc., 43 Fed. Reg. 59935 (Dec. 22, 1978);
Complaint of Great Western Sugar Co., 46 Fed. Reg. 49697 (Oct. 7, 1981).
154. The Great Western Malting complaint was terminated by negotiation with the
EC. 45 Fed. Reg. 41558 (June 19, 1980). The Great Plains Wheat complaint also was
terminated after negotiations with the EC. These negotiations, especially as related to
the Tokyo Round negotiations, are discussed in Patterson, supra note 44. The Miller's
National Federation complaint was submitted to the GATT for final adjudication on
December 14, 1981, as part of a broad U.S. assault on the CAP. 388 U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY (BNA) 332, 333 (Dec. 22, 1981).
155. AM. SOC. OF INT'L L., supra note 7, at 132-33 (comments of R. Hudec).
156. The Article XVI:3 modifications were negotiated and tabled in December, 1978.
THE-ToKYO RoUND, supra note 59, at 56. The panel reported their decision on Novem-
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that the panel members were aware of the results. 157 The standards
applied regarding displacement 5 8 and "previous representative
period"' 5 9 were substantially identical to those established by the
Subsidies Code. As such, the Australian decision represents relevant
GATT precedent. The Brazilian case, also filed in 1978, attacked
EC sugar export subsidies on the same Article XVI grounds. 60 The
panel in the Brazilian case expressly applied the standards adopted
at the Tokyo Round.' 6' These decisions are best analyzed with reference to the EC's sugar policy and the features of the world sugar
market.
A.

THE CAP SUGAR POLICY

The CAP sugar policy 162 is a three-tiered system of escalating
price restrictions without mandatory production limits. 63 Through
member states, the CAP assigns quotas to each producer and grower
in the EC.'" Each producer may produce as much as it desires, but
will receive full subsidies only up to its "basic quota" (type A
sugar). 65 Using a production levy, the CAP partially withholds subsidies assessed aginst production up to a specified quantity in excess
of the basic quota. This is termed "maximum quota" (type B
ber 6, 1979, nearly one year after the modified provisions came into being. AUSTRALIAN
DECISION, supra note 11, at 290.
157. The panelists were senior GATT representatives of countries neutral to the dispute: Finland, Switzerland and Turkey. AUSTRALIAN DECISION, supra note 11, at 291.
Thus the panelists were most likely aware of the Tokyo Round results.
158. Cf. AUSTRALIAN DECISION, supra note 11, at 310 ("The Panel was of the opinion
that the term 'more than an equitable share of world export trade' should include situations in which the effect of an export subsidy granted by a signatory was to displace the
exports of another signatory, bearing in mind the development in world markets.") with
Subsidies Code, supra note 3, art. 10, para. 2(a) (" 'more than equitable share of world
export trade' shall include any case in which the effect of an export subsidy granted by a
signatory is to displace the exports of another signatory bearing in mind the development
on world markets").
159. The panel analyzed market changes with reference to a previous representative
period of three years as specified in the Subsidies Code. Compare AUSTRALIAN DECISION, supra note 11, at 308 ("The three most recent calendar years for which market
conditions could be considered as normal"), with Subsidies Code, supra note 3, art. 10,
para. 2(c) ("[A] 'previous representative period' shall normally be the three most recent
calendar years in which normal market conditions existed."). The panel took great pains
to apply the three year standard, excluding 1975, when abnormal market conditions
existed. AUSTRALIAN DECISION, supra note 11, at 307-08. The panel also rejected an
Australian request for a seven year reference period. Id at 297-98.
160. BRAZILIAN DECISION, supra note 14, at 69.
161. Id at 88.
162. See EEC Regulation No. 1009/67, Common Organizationof the Sugar Market
(Brussels: Commission of the European Community, 1967).
163. Smith, EECSugarPolicy in an InternationalContext, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 95,
96 (1981).
164. Id
165. Id
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sugar).166 The CAP allows no subsidy on any amount over maximum quota (type C sugar), although producers may produce type C
167
sugar and sell it at world market prices.
In establishing the system, the EC member nations agreed that
guaranteed internal prices would be set at a relatively high level and
that production would be limited by quotas. 168 The system thus
depends heavily upon the quantities selected for quotas, both basic
and maximum, and upon production levies, to determine output and
cost. The CAP estimates consumption for the year and sets the basic
quota to account for consumption and imports mandated by the
Lomb- Convention. 69 The amount of sugar permitted within the
maximum quota and the production levies on type B sugar are then
set. 170 In principle, the amount of the levy should equal the cost of
export subsidies and surplus disposal. 171 In fact, the EC Council traditionally has placed a ceiling on the production levy well below the
172
actual disposal cost.
In 1975, in response to high EC consumption and high world
prices, the EC Council of Ministers increased the basic quota by
8.7% (from 8.4 million tons to 9.136 million tons). 173 In addition, the
maximum quota was increased from 118% of the basic quota to
145% of the expanded basic quota.' 74 Finally, the production levy
Was abolished for two years.' 75 Producers reacted strongly to the
1975 plan. The area planted in sugar beets established a record in
1976-77, but due to poor weather production did not increase appreciably until 1978, when exports of sugar rose 107% from 1.696 million tons in 1977 to 3.508 million tons.' 76 These developments
created a sugar surplus which eventually gave rise to the 1978 Australian and Brazilian claims. 177
166. Id
167. Id For a more complete explanation of CAP sugar export subsidy mechanics, see
AUSTRALIAN DEcISION, supra note 10, at 301-04. See also GATT STUDY No. 12, supra
note 29, at 188-90.
168. Smith, supra note 163, at 96.
169. Id The Lom6 Convention is an agreement between the EC and developing African, Caribbean and Pacific states. Under Protocol 3 of the Convention, the EC undertakes to buy 1.3 million tons of sugar from the developing nations. For a discussion of
the role played by Lom6 Convention sugar imports in the allocation of EC sugar quotas
see id at 104-10.
170. Id
171. GATT STuDY No. 12, supra note 29, at 189.
172. Id
173. Smith, supra note 163, at 97-98.
174. Id

175. Id
176. Id at 98.
177. Id at 103.
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B.

FEATURES OF THE WORLD SUGAR MARKET

World sugar trade takes place in a narrow, supply sensitive
market.178 The amount of sugar in world free trade is very small
compared to total world production.17 9 One commentator described
the world sugar trade as follows:
Out of a total world production of about 91m. tonnes of raw sugar in 197879, only about 18m. tonnes was traded internationally. Of this, about 8m.
tonnes was traded at negotiated prices under either special arrangements or
long-term bilateral contracts which major importing countries have concluded with their principal overseas suppliers. Thus the market which fixes
the world price represents little more than 10m. tonnes, and on such a market

small changes in supply can produce enormous changes in
comparatively
l8 0
price.

The world sugar market also is marked by a well-known cyclical price fluctuation in which short periods of high prices are followed by long periods of depressed prices. 181 A period of high prices
prompts the planting of sugar cane which takes two years to develop.
Sugar from the cane is available for a number of years without
prices may have fallen below producreplanting, even though world
182
tion costs in the interim.
These market characteristics have engendered a price-stabilizing accord, the 1977 International Sugar Agreement (ISA).183 All
major sugar producing nations are signatories. 184 (The EC is not.)

supplies
Sugar-producing signatories to the ISA agree to withhold
i8 5
prices.
depressed
of
periods
from world markets in
As noted above, the EC released 3.508 million tons of sugar into
world export sugar trade. Due to the peculiar characteristhe 81978
tics' 6 of the international sugar market, most significantly the comparatively small amount of sugar in world free trade, the EC's
contribution in 1978 was a significant factor in sugar market supplies.' 8 7 , The EC's share of the total market in sugar exports

increased from an average of 3.325% during 1973-76 to 19.1% during
1978.188
178. Id at 102-03.

179. Id
180. Id at 102.
181. Id at 103.
182. Id

183. International Sugar Agreement, October 7, 1977, 80 Stat. 271, T.I.A.S. No. 9664.
184. Casterside, ECONOMIST, March 1, 1980, at 72.
185. AuSTRALiAN DECISION, supra note 11, at 305.
186. See id
187. Smith, supra note 163, at 102.

188. Id (averages extrapolated from author's computations).
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GATT PANEL DECISIONS

In the Australian case, the GATT panel first analyzed the facts
under the displacement standard applied in the earlier French Wheat
case. 189 After direct displacement and equitable share analyses, the
panel was unable to find that the EC subsidies had enabled it to
attain "more than an equitable share of world export trade" within
the meaning of Article XVI:3. The panel concluded that, with the
possible exception of the Chinese market, EC sugar had not directly
displaced Australian sugar in any individual market. 190 Noticing,
however, that EC refined sugar exports had made strong inroads into
important raw sugar outlets (the lower EC price reduced the incentive to purchase raw sugar and refine it), the panel felt that continued
subsidization of EC refined sugar could displace raw sugar sales
which could, in turn, displace Australian raw sugar in residual markets. 19 1 Although the panel found no "clear evidence" of such "indirect" displacement, the panel concluded that Australian producers
might be injured upon the expiration of their long-term bilateral
agreements. 92 Finally, reductions in sugar exports by ISA members
complicated the world export market so that the panel was unable to
determine whether the EC's increased market share was
93
inequitable.
Failing to find an express violation of Article XVI:3, the panel
assessed the effects of the EC sugar subsidy regulations. The panel
noted that the CAP had failed to prevent an increase in subsidized
exports, despite some efforts toward that end.' 94 The panel not only
found that EC measures were ineffective, but also that subsidization
was unrestricted. If FEOGA I95 allocations were insufficient, the
Commission could have recourse to a supplementary budget so that,
"there would. . . be no legally fixed budgetary limits for how much
could be spent on export refunds for sugar."' 196 Based upon this
finding the panel concluded that the EC system constituted a threat
of seriousprejudice within the meaning of Article XVI: 1.97
189. Id at 313-14. See supra text accompanying notes 70-74.
190. AUSTRALIAN DECISION, supra note 11, at 310-13. The panel divided world sugar
trade into five relevant groupings: markets of direct EC-Australian competition, Australian exports to the EC, major outlets for Australian exports, certain markets in the Mediterranean and Middle East where EC exports had increased, and other destinations. Id
191. Id at 313-15.
192. Id at 315.
193. Id at 319.
194. Id at 316.
195. FEOGA is the French acronym for the EC agency administering the CAP. See
supra text accompanying note 41.
196. AUSTRALIAN DECISION, supra note 11.

197. Id at 319.
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The reasoning of the Brazilian decision mirrors that of the Australian case. The panel's "close examination of individual markets
did not produce clear and general evidence that [EC] exports had
directly displaced Brazilian exports." 198 The panel found a simultaneous "decline in Brazilian sales and an increase in imports from the
[EC] in only a few markets of minor importance."' 199 The panel
therefore concluded that EC sugar subsidies had not resulted in the
EC "having more than an equitable share of world export trade," in
terms of Article XVI:3. 2 °° As in the Australian case, the panel rendering the Brazilian decision complained that EC regulations had
failed to prevent increased export levels, 20 1 and that financing was
unrestricted. 20 2 These factors again formed the basis of the panel's
decision that "the [EC] system of granting export refunds on sugar
. . . constituted a seriousprejudice to Brazilian interests, in terms of

Article

XVI:l.

' 20 3

Both sugar decisions are legally makeshift, although they are
politically sound. The panels in the Australian and Brazilian decisions engaged in exhaustive applications of displacement analysis. In
each case, however, factual complexities prevented formal rulings
under Article XVI:3, the GATT provision specifically addressing
agricultural export subsidies. 2°4 Instead, the panels expressed their
displeasure to the CAP sugar export subsidy using Article XVI:l, a
historically ineffective provision imposing weak notification and
consultation requirements on all subsidizing nations.20 5 Considering
the exhuastive and unsuccessful survey of potential liability under
Article XVI:l, these decisions appear to have an artificial quality.
Politically, these decisions wisely avoid a direct challenge to the
CAP. 2 ° 6 Article XVI:1 merely requires discussions concerning "the
possibility of limiting the subsidization. ' 20 7 These discussions
started in 1980.
198. BRAZILIAN DECISION, supra note 14, at 97.
199. Id
200. Id
201. Id at 94.
202. Id at 97.
203. Id
204. For a discussion of GATT Article XVI:3 provisions and their ineffectiveness see
supra text accompanying notes 65-78.
205. For a discussion of Article XVI:I provisions see supra text accompanying notes
59-63.
206. Hudec, supra note 4, at 192.
207. GATT, supra note 1, art. XVI, para. 1.
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IMPASSE IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE SUGAR DECISION

The GATT panel procedure exists in an rl-defined area
between law and diplomacy. GATT panels decide cases with reference to a legal code, the GATT, but have no enforcement powers.
Theoretically, the GATT may sanction offending nations, 20 8 but it
has done so only once since 1947.209 The GATT relies on the normative force of organized community condemnation, as expressed
through diplomatic channels, to achieve compliance from offending
members. 210 In the instant case, the community condemnation
largely consists of discussions between the GATT signatory nations,
principally the other primary product exporters, and the EC. In the
two years since the adjudication of the Australian complaint,
enforcement efforts have failed to force EC reforms of the CAP that
were satisfactory to the GATT signatory nations. They claim that,
1
despite some reforms, the CAP still violates GATT Article XVI: 1.21

Due to internal EC concerns, however, reforms satisfactory to the
2 12
GATT signatories are highly unlikely.
Initially, the sugar decisions brought little change. The GATT
Council adopted the Australian decision in November 1979.213

Throughout 1980, Australia regularly reminded the Council of the
panel's findings. 2 14 At the 1979 Council meeting, the EC indicated

that all measures possible would be implemented by the Community.215 In fact, the EC Commission proposed a limited modification
of the sugar export subsidy system in November 1979, but it was
21 6
rejected by the EC Council of Ministers.
After mid-1980, the EC altered its subsidy system while GATT

enforcement efforts accelerated. Starting in December 1980, after
208. GATT Article XXIII (2) empowers the Contracting Parties to "authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or
parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine
to be appropriate in the circumstances." GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII, para. 2.
209. Graham,.supranote 6, at 156 n. 8, 171. See generally Hudecsupranote 4, at 14953.
210. Hudec, supra note 4, at 150.
211. Hume, Porges & Ehrenhaft, supra note 20 at 847; Riddle-me-ree, supra note 19.
212. See infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
213. GATT, GATT ACTrvrEs IN 1979, 72-75 (1980).
214. GATT, GATT AcrvirnEs IN 1980, 46 (1981).
215. Hume, Porges & Ehrenhaft, supra note 20 at 847.
216. The EC Commission proposed a modification in the sugar subsidy which would
have reduced the aggregate EC basic and maximum quotas. Smith, supra note 163, at 99.
The proposed system would have had little effect on actual production, however, because
the overall quota reduction would have been achieved through a reallocation of quotas
from EC members failing to achieve their original allocation to members surpassing their
initial quotas. Id at 100. The plan would not have satisfied the GATT signatories
because it imposed no mandatory limits on production or exports. In any event, the EC
Council of Ministers rejected the proposal, insisting that high production be maintained
as insurance against a shortage. A Sweeter Pill, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 1980, at 54.
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the GATT Council had accepted the Brazilian decision, 2 17 a Working Party conducted discussions with the EC concerning its compliance with the panel decisions in both the Australian and Brazilian
cases.2 18 Exporters sought assurances that the EC would enforce
some limits on its subsidies, 2 19 but the EC rebuffed their suggestions,
claiming that its system complied with GATT Article XVI:I, and
that the current high price of sugar had removed the need for sugar
export subsidies.2 20
While GATT enforcement efforts met stiff resistance, the EC
did institute some modifications in the sugar export subsidy system.
In late 1980, the EC feared that it would overspend its budget. 22' EC
Farm Commissioner, Finn Gundelach, seized upon this fear to prepare a broad CAP reform, limiting support to surplus production of
cereals, dairy products, sugar, beef, tobacco, and fruits and vegetables. 222 During early 1981, however, high world prices for cereals,
sugar and dairy products cut CAP export subsidy spending and
increased EC revenues, temporarily removing the budget constraints

prompting the reform.223 In April, 1981 the EC Council of Ministers
rejected most of the reform.2 2 4 The major survivor was a "co-

responsibility" tax on all sugar production within the maximum
quota. 225 The survival of the sugar reform apparently resulted from
an agreement between the French and the English rather than from
226
GATT pressure.
The EC claims that the new "co-responsibility" levies will cause

producers, and not the FEOGA, to bear the cost of sugar sur217. GATT AcnvrriEs IN 1980, supra note 214, at 47.
218. Id at 49.
219. Hume, Porges & Ehrenhaft, supra note 20 at 847.
220. Id
221. The resources of the EC are limited to one percent of the Value Added Tax
(VAT) collected by its member nations. The proposed 1981 EC budget, without accounting for farm price increases and corresponding CAP expenses, was just below the VAT
imposed ceiling. They Took an Axe and Gave the Budget 40 Whacks, ECONOMIST, Sept.
27, 1980, at 60.
222. Gundelach proposed three "co-responsibility" devices (flat rate taxes, superlevies, and production quantums) calculated to reduce CAP costs by increasing private
industry's financing of surplus disposal. ConsumersAlways Pay, ECONOMIST, Oct. 25,
1980, at 49-50; Mend, Don'tEnd, the CAP, ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 1980, at 56.
223. The Temptation ofEurope's FarmMinisters, ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 1981 at 5 1-52;
Not a Bad Package if it Doesn't FallApart, ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 1981, at 41-42; We'll
Fight the Good Fght Another Day, ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 1981, at 44-45.
224. We'll Fight the Good Fight Another Day, supra note 223, at 44. The continued
success of the CAP without reform depends upon world food prices staying high, which
they did throughout 1981. Saved by World FoodPrice ECONOMIST, May 30, 1981, at
46; Saving the EEC, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1981, at 12.
225. We'll Fight the Good FightAnother Day, supra note 223, at 44.
226. A Tenfold Farm Chorus of Disapproval,ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 1981, at 47-48.
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pluses.227 The reform may have two ameliorative effects. Private
financing would eliminate FEOGA support. The panel strongly criticized the CAP subsidy program due to unlimited FEOGA financ-

ing. More significantly, to the extent that the subsidy would no
longer be government funded, it may be beyond the scope of GATT
scrutiny. 228
The new regulations 229 do not, in fact, guarantee private financing. A close examination of the new EC subsidy regulations demonstrates that the presence of government financing is dependent on the
world market price for sugar. When prices are high, relative to the
EC internal price, as they were in 1981,230 the government is not
required to provide financing.23' When world prices are sufficiently
low, relative to the EC internal price, the export subsidies needed
may exceed the "co-responsibility" levies collected from producers.32 2 The prospect of public financing arises because maximum
production levies on type A and type B sugar are fixed by the regulation. A newly instituted tax, the basic production levy on all type A
and B sugar, purports to cover the losses generated by export subsidies, but it is limited to 2% of the sugar intervention price.233 A levy
placed only on type B sugar finances losses in excess of the basic
227. In a Covering Note to the GATT, the EC claims that EC producers will bear all
costs is disposing of EC-produced surplus sugar without financial support from FEOGA.
"[A]ny export refund awarded on surplus sugar produced in the Community will from
now on be paid by the producers themselves." Covering Note, GATT Doc. L/5175
(1981). The introduction to the regulation recognizes the need for "producers themselves
[to] meet in full the cost of disposing of the surpluses," and that "such a system should
apply for a limited period only and should be regarded as transitional." Council Regulation on the Common Organization of the Markets in the Sugar Sector 24, O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 177) 4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CouncilRegulation].
228. A long interpretive note to the GATT exempts certain limited types of price stabilization systems from Articles XVI:3. GATT, Annex I, at Article XVI, BISD (4th
Supp.) 62, 68 (1969). Regardless of whether a system satisfies the stated criteria, however, "operations under such a system shall be subject to the provisions of paragraph 3
[Article XVI:3] where they are wholly orpartlyfnancedout ofgovernmentfunds in addition to the funds collected from producers in respect of the product concerned." Id sec.
B, para. 3(2) [emphasis added]. The CAP is, however, highly unlikely to fulfill these
criteria for a price stabilization scheme because its funds derive from EC governments.
229. CouncilRegulation, supra note 227.
230. See supra note 224.
231. Recent high world sugar prices have enabled the EC to collect levies on sugar
exports equal to the difference between high world market prices and relatively low EC
internal prices. The Temptation of Europe's Farm Ministers,supra note 223, at 52.
232. When prices have been low, the EC has engaged in huge subsidizations. In 1978,
EC sugar export subsidies rose to 75% of the internal support price. Smith, supra note
163, at 99. Even more astonishing is a fact that the Australians revealed in their argument before the GATT panel: "In August 1978 when the London Daily Price for white
sugar stood at U.S. $206 per ton, the Community exporters were able to avail themselves
of a subsidy equivalent to U.S. $403 per ton." AUSTRALIAN DECISION, supra note 11, at
293.
233. CouncilRegulation, supra note 227, art. 28, sec. 3, at 19.
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production levy, but it is limited to 37.5% of the intervention price. 234
Although this is an improvement over the previous 30% levy, it may
be insufficient to cover the difference between the world market price
and the intervention price, which has at times equaled 75% of the
intervention price23 5 Unless the Council of Ministers sets the sugar
intervention price at a surprisingly low level, 236 the FEOGA will

have to provide price support financing if the world price falls sufficiently. Given the cyclical fluctuations of world market sugar
prices, 237 the EC's claim of private export subsidy financing will certainly be tested.
In addition, the new regulations do not limit sugar production.
As before, type C sugar receives no subsidies. 238 Under the regula239
tions, the production of type C sugar may continue unrestrained.
Moreover, it must be exported. 240 The new regulations, then, fail to
respond to the core of the panel's decision, that the lack of limits on
the sugar subsidy system threatens seriousprejudice to other GATT
241
signatories.
As a result of the sugar subsidy modifictions, the EC may argue
in good faith that it has complied with Article XVI:l. Upon a
finding of seriousprejudice under Article XVI:I, a subsidizing nation
must "discuss.

.

.the possibility of limiting the subsidization." 242 In

the instant case, the EC participated in Working Party discussions
and reduced its subsidies on type A and type B sugar through "coresponsibility" levies.
Despite EC compliance with the minimal Article XVI:l requirements, the GATT signatories, especially Australia and the United
States, are continuing enforcement efforts. 243 The Australians
renewed their attack on EC sugar subsidies at the GATT September
1981 meeting, and were joined for the first time publicly by the
United States. 244 The GATT established another Working Party to
discuss the question but it disbanded without progress. 245
234. Id sec. 4, at 19.
235. See supra note 232.
236. For a discussion of the political nature of the EC Council of Ministers, see supra
notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
238. CoveringNote, supra note 227, at 3.
239. CouncilRegulation, supra note 227, art. 26, sec. I at 18.
240. Id
241. AUSTRALIAN DECISION, supra note 11, at 319.
242. GATT, supra note 1, art. XVI, para. 1.
243. Riddle-me-ree, supra note 19.
244. Id While this is the first public effort by the United States to enforce either of the
sugar decisions, the U.S. previously has lent its weight to the enforcement process. AM.
Soc. INT'L L., supra note 7, at 140 (comments of M. Gadbaw).
245. Telephone Interview with Irving Williamson, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Oct. 6, 1981).
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The new EC regulations do not satisfy the GATT signatories.
Further compliance with the panel decision is highly improbable,
however, due to two fundamental EC considerations. First, the EC
is particularly sensitive to foreign attacks against the CAP. As the
single effective cooperative enterprise administered through the EC,
it has been described as the "glue" that binds the European states
into a community. 246 Thus, complaints concerning the CAP represent a threat to EC unity.247 Second, reductions in CAP subsidies
are politically unpopular among European farmers, who are outspoken and politically powerful. During the 1981 EC Council of Ministers price setting meeting in Brussels, the farmers protested in the
streets and clashed with police. 248 Before the meeting, budgetary
constraints pressured the Council of Ministers to consider CAP
reforms, but when the budgetary pressures temporarily subsided, the
Council of Ministers quickly rejected the reforms in response to farm
pressures.24 9 In addition, the absence of budgetary pressures, caused
by currently high food prices, 250 removes any immediate incentive

for EC reform of this popular policy.
E.

DANGERS OF STRICT ENFORCEMENT

The GATT signatories should terminate their attempts to
strictly enforce the sugar decisions. The holding in these decisions,
relying on the seriousprejudice rather than the displacement standard, are inconsistent with a major accomplishment of the Tokyo
Round's Subsidies Code---the codifiction of displacement as the
applicable standard for GATT review of agricultural export subsidies. Politically, strict enforcement of these decisions heightens tension surrounding the CAP. As for future decisions, reliance on the
seriousprejudice provision threatens the development of case law
based on the displacement standard. Evolution of the displacement
standard within the GATT panel procedure is important not only
because it helps implement the consensus reached at the Tokyo
Round, but also because it is hoped that the standard will regulate
the CAP with greater precision and fairness. Undoubtedly, strict
enforcement is more popular among Australian and United States
246. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 27, at 1452; see 2 MTN STUDIES, supra note 96,
at 24: "Without a CAP, it is unlikely that the original six nation Common Market could
have been achieved. It is also unlikely that the Community of today could remain intact
without some form of common farm and food policy."
247. The EC has used this argument in resisting the reform of their wheat export
subsidies that is urged by the United States. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY, su.pra note 154, at
333.
248. We'll Fightthe Good FightAnother Day, supra note 224.
249. Id
250. See supra note 223.
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agricultural interests, but it may come at the expense of an international code of conduct governing agricultural export subsidies. In
addition, unsuccessful attempts at strict enforcement discredit the
effectiveness of GATT dispute settlement procedures at a time when
the panel procedure is a necessary instrument for the orderly elaboration of the Tokyo Round codes.
CONCLUSION
With respect to agricultural export subsidies, the major advance
of the Subsidies Code is the codification of the displacement standard, which is much more precise than its equitable share predecessor.25 1 Although the Subsidies Code recognizes a general cause of
action if any subsidy causes seriousprejudice to GATT signatories, it
merely repeats the ineffective standard of GATT Article XVI: 1.252 It
seems clear that despite the potential availability of two remedial
paths to litigants alleging harm from agricultural subsidies, the codification of the displacement standard is more significant to the continuing process of agricultural export subsidy regulation.
The decisions in the Brazilian and Australian sugar cases are
inconsistent with the results of the Tokyo Round. Neither panel was
able to find displacement.253 Instead, both panels held against the
EC based on the seriousprejudicestandard of Article XVI:I. 254 Each
case was thus a makeshift expression of displeasure with the CAP
sugar export subsidy. Following the GATT Council's acceptance of
the decisions and subsequent GATT Working Party discussions, the
EC adopted "co-responsibility" levies on sugar.255 Dissatisfaction
with the EC's "co-responsibility" modifications has prompted fursignatories. 256 These efforts
ther enforcement efforts by the GATT
257
are likely to fail for political reasons.
These enforcement efforts conflict with the necessary development of the displacement standard because they accentuate the divisive and extreme opinions surrounding the CAP, but lack the
legitimizing effect of the standard agreed to at the Tokyo Round.
The GATT signatories desire to enforce the panel's suggestion of
restraints regardless of the legal bases of the decisions. In response,
the EC adamantly claims that their subsidy is consistent with Article
XVI:l. Granted, the GATT signatory nations urging strict enforce251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See supra text accompanying notes 126-33.
See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 218-41 and accompanying text.
Id
See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
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ment have trade interests at stake. 258 In the present case, however,
these interests conflict with the need to create legitimate, enforceable, and effective rules regulating international trade. Tremendous
effort has been invested in the development of the Tokyo Round regulations. The future effectiveness of those rules requires continuing
consultation and litigation. 259 Nevertheless, the GATT signatories
seek to strictly enforce decisions that are inconsistent with the
essence of the Tokyo Round agreement on displacement.
Given the extreme opinions surrounding the CAP, the end of
the compromise was perhaps inevitable. 260 The Tokyo Round rules
were created to give some substantive structure and legitimacy to the
regulation of non-tariff barrier excesses, including those instituted by
the CAP. The EC agreed to regulate the CAP according to the displacement standard, although the strength of their resolve is in
doubt.26 1 The EC decision to regulate the CAP according to the
indefinite seriousprejudice standard is not as clear. The decisions are
inconsistent with the standard negotiated at the Tokyo Round.
Thus, strict enforcement of the present decisions demeans the "legalist" purpose of the Tokyo Round.
Moreover, the ineffective enforcement of these decisions threatens the newly re-invigorated GATT dispute settlement process. At
least initially, the dispute settlement process must have modest
goals. 262 Yet the GATT signatories ambitiously have attempted to
enforce decisions based on a weak GATT provision. The GATT
dispute settlement mechanism will lose credibility when EC compliance is not forthcoming. This is particularly regrettable due to the
present need for an effective dispute settlement process to continue
the "legalist" process begun by the Tokyo Round codes. 263
Because the decisions in the Australian and Brazilian cases are
inconsistent with the Subsidies Code displacement standard, and
because their enforcement threatens the GATT dispute settlement
mechanism, enforcement efforts should cease and the GATT signa258. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
260. The United States and the EC quietly compromised their differences regarding
CAP wheat export subsidies during the Tokyo Round negotiations. A complaint by
Great Plains Wheat Co. that CAP wheat export subsidies violated GATT Article XVI
was quickly settled in 1978. See Patterson, supra note 44, at 64-66. Since the completion
of the Tokyo Round, however, the United States has complained sharply about CAP
wheat export subsidies, and has filed a complaint in GATT for a formal adjudication.
U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY, supra note 154, at 333.
261. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
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tories should institute new complaints alleging CAP export subsidy
violations of the displacement standard.
Jeffrey S. Estabrook

